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The Fellowships at Auschwitz for the
Study of Professional Ethics and the
Moral Formation of Lawyers
Eric L. Muller
It is a brief digression in the film Conspiracy, a historical Holocaust drama.1
Fifteen mid-level bureaucrats sit around a conference table in a well-appointed
Berlin lakeside villa in January of 1942, gathered to coordinate a plan for
murdering all of Europe’s Jews. A representative of the Reich Interior Ministry
proposes mass sterilization rather than mass murder—“we’ll pinch off the
race at this generation,” as he puts it—because this, unlike outright genocide,
could be done consistently with German law. A Nazi Party representative
interrupts: “We make the law we need!” “Why am I telling you this?” he adds
in exasperation. “How many lawyers are in this room?” he asks. “Raise your
hands.”
Nine of the fifteen men put their hands in the air.
The conversation swiftly shifts back to genocide, and before long the focus
is the grisly logistics and mechanics of killing. Shocking stuff. But for the law
students screening Conspiracy as part of the law curriculum of the Fellowships
at Auschwitz for the Study of Professional Ethics (“FASPE”),2 the most
shattering moment is that little digression, the nine raised hands.3
They realize: Lawyers murdered the Jews of Europe.
Eric Muller is Dan K. Moore Distinguished Professor in Jurisprudence and Ethics, UNC School
of Law, and Director, Center for Faculty Excellence, UNC-Chapel Hill. Many thanks to my UNC
colleagues Dana Remus and Molly Sutphen, my wife Leslie Branden-Muller, and my daughter
Abby Muller for comments on a draft of this article.

1.

Conspiracy (HBO Films 2001).

2.

FASPE currently offers fellowship programs for students in four professional disciplines:
law, medicine, journalism, and seminary. See http://www.faspe.info (last visited June 23,
2014). A fifth program for business school students is being developed.

3.

While the meeting that Conspiracy depicts did take place, this particular dramatic moment
undoubtedly did not. The film is a dramatization of the discussions at Wannsee that strays
from the historical evidence—the minutes of the meeting that Adolf Eichmann prepared
—in order to make the meeting’s subject more intelligible and the characters of those in
attendance more vivid. See Alan E. Steinweis, Am. Hist. Rev., 107 (2002) (reviewing
Conspiracy (2001)).
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A few days later, the FASPE fellows walk through the gate and up the
driveway of that lakeside villa in Berlin. The movie’s exterior shots were filmed
on location, and the grounds and façade of what is now called the House of
the Wannsee Conference look the same today as they did seventy years ago.
So as the fellows step through the front door, they feel as though they are
crossing a threshold into history. They enter the meeting room and stand in
the spot where that earlier group of lawyers ratified the terms of annihilation
over cognac. They cannot help but see the chasm between the refined norms of
their profession and the savagery of what that refinement produced, because
they are standing where the chasm opened.
It gets harder. A day or two later, the FASPE fellows climb the concrete
stairs of an Auschwitz barrack to file past a display case, easily seventy-five feet
long, filled with two tons of human hair. The next day, at the Birkenau death
camp, they stop at a meadow where bodies were burned in the open air when
the crematoria were full. They listen to frogs croaking in ponds where human
ashes were dumped.
Though they are in no shape to think about it at this particular moment,
they surely will never be in a better position to appreciate Robert Cover’s
observation that “[l]egal interpretation takes place in a field of pain and
death.”4

***

The FASPE fellowship includes more than visits to Holocaust-related
sites. The program intersperses these visits with sessions on legal ethics and
the formation of professional identity. In these seminars, they are talking not
about how lawyers facilitated genocide, but how to manage duties of candor
and confidentiality, which case decisions a lawyer may control, and whether
junior associates are free to resist the commands of senior partners.5 They
are talking, in other words, about the ordinary sorts of problems they will
encounter in their own lives as practicing lawyers. The aspiration of FASPE is
that against the backdrop of the Holocaust and its lawyers, they will talk about
those problems in extraordinary ways and will emerge from the fellowship
with a deeper commitment to moral and ethical practice.
Surveys of the FASPE fellows tend to suggest that the fellowship realizes
this aspiration. The fellows’ sense of preparedness “to confront the ethical
issues that will arise in [their] professional practice” typically rises significantly
between pre- and post-trip assessments.6 This marked increase in feelings
of ethical preparedness suggest that FASPE is doing something effective—
something that may not be happening in ethics instruction within the walls of
4.

Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 Yale L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986).

5.

The program uses problems from Lisa G. Lerman & Philip G. Schrag, Ethical Problems
in the Practice of Law (3d ed. 2012) and Richard Zitrin et al., Legal Ethics in the
Practice of Law (3d ed. 2007).

6.

For example, in 2013, only 2 of 13 fellows rated their sense of preparedness at 8 or higher on
a 1-to-10 scale before the trip began, while 9 of 13 did so by the trip’s end.
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US law schools.7 The FASPE program has not been rigorously evaluated to
determine which of its components are most effective at increasing the fellows’
sense of preparedness to meet the ethical challenges of law practice. However,
several components of the FASPE experience distinguish it from the ethics
and professionalism curricula common in American law schools:
• FASPE immerses students in history by taking them to the physical
sites where lawyers worked and where the consequences of their
work unfolded. In other words, it invokes the power of place as a
pedagogical tool.
• FASPE focuses on lawyers’ roles in a paradigmatically evil system. It
does not seek to inspire fellows with stories of heroic lawyers fighting
for justice. It unabashedly teaches by negative example.
• FASPE is a completely immersive, intensely personal, and often
emotional experience. The fellows, two FASPE faculty members,
and several FASPE staff members are together for twelve straight
days, living and learning together in places that have known great
human suffering. It presents an opportunity for group cohesion and
for sustained (even unremitting) engagement that no American law
school course could attain.
In this Essay, I explore these distinctive attributes of the FASPE law
program.8 The third of them—its full-immersion approach—makes clear that
FASPE is a pedagogy that cannot easily be replicated as part of the program
of legal education in an American law school. It is very expensive,9 surely too
expensive for an era in which most of the conversation about American legal
education is about cutting costs.10 And yet the success of the program calls out
for examination, if only to see whether aspects of its approach might transfer
to a U.S. law school setting.
The Fellowships at Auschwitz for the Study of Professional Ethics are twelveday study experiences for professional school students in four disciplines: law,
medicine, journalism, and religion.11 They are administered by the Museum
of Jewish Heritage in New York City on the strength of financial support
from private donors. All four programs are grounded on the same idea: that
students training in these professions can deepen their commitment to ethical
7.

According to the 2010 Law School Survey of Student Engagement (“LSSSE”), only 57
percent of U.S. law students in their final year of study feel “very much” or “quite” prepared
to “deal[ ] with ethical dilemmas that arise as part of law practice.” See Law School Survey
of Student Engagement, 2010 Annual Survey Results 8 (Table 1), http://lssse.iub.edu/
pdf/2010/2010_LSSSE_Annual_Survey_Results.pdf (last visited June 23, 2014).

8.

I have been a FASPE law faculty member for four years and have had a significant hand in
the development of its curriculum.

9.

The fellowship covers the costs of air and ground transportation, accommodations, food,
and educational materials for each fellow.

10.

See Brian Z. Tamanaha, Failing Law Schools (2013).

11.

See supra note 3. An additional program for business school students is also contemplated.
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practice by studying the roles that their professions played, in the places where
they played them, in the Holocaust.
The law program’s curriculum presents a mix of historical study and
discussion of current problems in legal ethics, and proceeds (with modest
annual variations) as follows.
Pre-trip Assignments
The fellows are given two assignments to complete before gathering in
New York City in late May to begin the program. First, they are asked to read
two books and an article: an excellent, very short history of the Holocaust by
historian Doris Bergen,13 Primo Levi’s searing Survival in Auschwitz,14 and an old
but concise history of the German bar in the Third Reich from the American
Journal of Legal History.15
Second, the fellows are asked to write and submit a legal memorandum in
response to a problem based loosely on the one Richard Weisberg describes
in his article “The Hermeneutic of Acceptance and the Discourse of the
Grotesque, with a Classroom Exercise on Vichy Law.”16 The problem asks the
fellows to put themselves in the shoes of an English-trained lawyer on the
German-occupied Isle of Jersey in 1943 and advise a Jersey government official
on whether, under the German-imposed racial laws in force on the island at
that time, two described island residents should or should not be deemed
“Jews.” It comes as a shock to the fellows to see the German laws on Jews
published in English and to learn that lawyers trained in England enforced
them in a British Crown Dependency. The ways in which the fellows do (or
do not) apply the laws to the facts in their memoranda become important
touchstones for the discussion that lies ahead on the trip to Europe.
12

The Trip: New York
The law fellows gather for their FASPE trip at the Museum of Jewish
Heritage in lower Manhattan in late May.17 The program’s first two days are at
the museum and include an ice-breaking activity, an historical overview of the
Nazis’ rise to power, a chance to explore the museum’s exhibits and to hear the
12.

The number of fellows varies slightly from year to year but averages thirteen, and includes
students who have completed their first, second, and third years of law school as well as an
occasional LL.M. student. They are selected in a highly competitive application process
from a pool of applicants that regularly exceeds two hundred.

13.

Doris L. Bergen, War and Genocide (2d ed. 2009).

14.

Primo Levi, Survival in Auschwitz (1947).

15.

Kenneth Willig, The Bar in the Third Reich, 20 Am. J. Legal Hist. 1 (1976).

16.

17 Cardozo L. Rev. 1875 (1996).

17.

Gathering at the same time and place were the fellows in the FASPE Journalism Program.
The Law and Journalism programs travel and socialize together throughout the trip and
visit many historical sites together but follow different curricula unique to their disciplines.
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personal narrative of a Holocaust survivor, and a screening of the film Conspiracy
mentioned at the beginning of this essay. Seminar discussions begin with an
exploration of the validity of some of the most commonly voiced explanations
for the behavior of German lawyer-perpetrators: an excessive commitment
to legal positivism and obedience to authority. Conversation focuses on
Gustav Radbruch’s well-known formula for deviating from positivism18 and
on Stanley Milgram’s notorious obedience experiments in New Haven in the
early 1960s.19 A discussion of the approaches the fellows took in responding to
the Isle of Jersey problem allows them to consider the extent to which various
professional and situational circumstances led them to consider applying,
undermining, or rejecting the Nazi laws defining who was a Jew.
Berlin
After two days at the museum in New York, they fly overnight to Berlin
and immediately set out on a historical walking tour focusing on Jewish life in
the city before and during the Nazi years. The capstone of the day is a visit to
the somber steles of the Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe near the
Brandenburg Gate and the powerful museum installed beneath the memorial.
After a good night’s sleep, the fellows spend the morning touring the
Topography of Terror, a museum at the site of the Third Reich’s security nerve
center that documents the Nazi bureaucracy of repression and genocide. The
afternoon is devoted to the first of several sessions featuring group work based
on hypothetical current-day problems in legal ethics. These problems range
widely across the landscape of law practice. The fellows might discuss how to
respond as a law firm associate to a partner’s demand for an unsupportable
opinion letter, or how and whether a criminal defense lawyer should crossexamine a truthful witness, or how to advise a corporate client about whether
to take advantage of a costly contract drafting error by opposing counsel.
The next day in Berlin begins with a visit to the austere but haunting
memorial at Track 17 of the Grünewald train station in an elegant residential
district. This is the track where the majority of Berlin’s Jews were put on trains
and deported to the east; it goes unmentioned, but is surely on everyone’s
minds, that in a couple of days we will ourselves head east to see the depots at
the other end of the line. The afternoon is spent at the House of the Wannsee
Conference. After a sobering historical tour, the fellows work in small groups
on short research projects about Nazi law and Nazi judges, and then gather
for a full-group discussion of the career of Bernhard Lösener, the lawyer who
manned the “Jewish Desk” at the Reich Interior Ministry from 1933 to early
1943.20 Lösener was something of a complex figure who, on the one hand,
18.

Gustav Radbruch, Statutory Lawlessness and Supra-Statutory Law, in Law and Morality: Readings
in Legal Philosophy 127-36 (David Dyzenhaus, et al. eds., 2007).

19.

Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View (1974); Arthur G.
Miller, What Can the Milgram Obedience Experiments Tell Us about the Holocaust?, in The Social
Psychology of Good and Evil (Arthur G. Miller ed., 2004).

20.

Legislating

the

Holocaust: The Bernhard Loesener Memoirs

and

Supporting
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helped draft many of the key laws and regulations that isolated and persecuted
Germany’s Jews, but, on the other hand, worked against Party pressure to
expand the definition of who counted as a Jew and resigned his position when
he could no longer avoid knowing that the Reich’s program had shifted to
outright genocide. Lösener’s career provides rich fodder for consideration
of the impact of professional ambition and of the merits and demerits of
continuing or discontinuing representation.
A final day in Berlin includes additional seminar sessions working through
difficult ethical scenarios in everyday law practice. The fellows also meet with
a German lawyer who discusses the legacy of the German bar’s complicity in
the creation and maintenance of the Nazi legal regime for later generations of
German lawyers and judges.21
Poland
The fellows next fly to Krakow in southern Poland. A day and a half in
this picturesque old city center includes an historical presentation about the
complicated story of Poland and the Jews before and during World War II,
additional ethical-problem-based seminar sessions, and a tour of Kazimierz,
Krakow’s erstwhile Jewish quarter.
The following two days are devoted to guided tours of the Auschwitz I and
Birkenau camps in the town of Oswieçim. The two camp sites are strikingly
different from each other. The smaller Auschwitz I, with its tall and wellpreserved brick barracks and its infamous “Arbeit Macht Frei” metal gate, is
home to a somewhat outdated but nonetheless traumatizing museum display
featuring mountains of shoes, eyeglasses, prosthetics, clothing, suitcases, and
other remains of the Nazis’ victims. The vast Birkenau camp, where hundreds
of thousands were gassed, was mostly destroyed at war’s end and offers
relatively little in the way of curatorial interpretation. It has more of the feel of
a cemetery or memorial park than Auschwitz I, which is simply an onslaught of
horrors. The fellowship’s curriculum includes no seminar meetings or focused
discussions of professional ethics on these days, though each day offers the
fellows the opportunity to meet for open-ended discussion of what they have
seen, learned, and felt.
For the final two days of the trip, the fellows return to Krakow for further
seminar sessions. At this point in the trip, the themes that emerge have to do
with the legacy of the tragic history they have studied. The fellows screen and
discuss a powerful documentary film called “Inheritance,”22 which narrates
a painful meeting at the site of the Plaszow concentration camp in Krakow
between the daughter of the camp’s brutal commander Amon Goeth and a
Documents (Karl Schleunes ed., 2001).
21.

In the summer of 2014, the German lawyer was law professor Bernhard Schlink, author of,
among other things, the bestselling novel The Reader (1997) and Guilt about the Past
(2010), a penetrating collection of essays exploring the continued relevance of the Nazi era
for Germans today.

22.

Inheritance (Allentown Productions, 2006).
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Jewish inmate of Plaszow who worked as a slave in Goeth’s home. The film
triggers thoughtful discussion of the relevance of the Holocaust story to
successive generations and the challenges of judgment and reconciliation.
Another session focuses on post-war efforts to bring Nazi perpetrators to justice.
Using a chapter from David Fraser’s provocative book Law After Auschwitz,23 the
fellows reflect on whether the Nazi legal system was fundamentally continuous
or discontinuous with German legal systems that preceded and followed the
Third Reich, and with the legal systems of other Western nations.24 At this late
point in the trip, this is a crucial question. The FASPE program assumes that
what German lawyers did and didn’t do between 1933 and 1945 can contribute
to the professional formation of today’s young lawyers, but the nature of that
contribution varies for each FASPE fellow at least in part as a function of
how relevant the Nazi example seems to his or her own life. This penultimate
session enables the fellows to address this question directly, and with the
knowledge they have gained over ten days of travel and study.
The trip’s final seminar session looks ahead rather than to the past. Keying
off of David Luban’s thoughtful article Integrity: Its Causes and Cures,25 the fellows
are asked to discuss the strategies that might be available to them to keep from
slipping (or plunging) into unethical or—what is not quite the same—immoral
behavior. The discussion is personal and powerful, naturally spilling over into
broader reflection about the meaning and impact of the FASPE experience and
of the personal relationships the fellows have built during their time together.
Post-trip Assignment
FASPE asks that upon returning from the trip, the fellows write a paper
about legal ethics, on a topic of their choosing, to reflect their engagement
with the themes and lessons of their fellowship experience. The range of topics
is remarkable: papers submitted after the FASPE trip in 2013 explored the role
of humility in pro bono work,26 the propriety of a government lawyer’s declining
to defend an immoral law,27 the geography of the Holocaust and ethics in
environmental law,28 and many other interesting themes.
FASPE does not purport to function as a residential law school curriculum
in ethics or professionalism. It can only supplement, and not replace, a
residential course or courses. It is instructive, however, to consider how FASPE
23.

David Fraser, Law After Auschwitz (2006).

24.

See Eric L. Muller, Of Nazis, Americans, and Educating against Catastrophe, 60 Buff. L. Rev. 323,
338-43 (2011).

25.

David Luban, Integrity: Its Causes and Cures, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 279 (2003).

26.

Kristen Bell, Learning Humility (2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).

27.

Johnston Chen, When Defenders of the Law Choose not to Defend: Attorney General Kane and Pennsylvania’s
Ban on Same-Sex Marriage, 2013 FASPE J., at 25.

28.

Carson Thomas, Stones Will Speak: Environmental Ethics and a Geography of the Holocaust, 2013
FASPE J., at 29.
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fits into the evolving discourse on the pedagogy of ethics and professionalism
in American law schools.
The question of how to teach ethics to aspiring lawyers has arisen
episodically for decades. The Association of American Law Schools convened
national conferences on the subject in Boulder, Colorado, in 1956 and 1968,
and another in 1977 in Detroit.29 The topic grew somewhat pressing by the time
of the third of these AALS gatherings, because the American Bar Association
had recently amended its accreditation standards for law schools to require
instruction in professional responsibility.30 The topic also shifted somewhat in
focus over these two decades due to the rise of clinical legal education31: for the
first time it became possible for students to study ethics experientially rather
than through abstract lecture and dialogue in classrooms.
The next cycle of debate about legal ethics instruction occurred in the early
1990s, when the W.M. Keck Foundation invested nearly $5 million in grants
over a five-year period to study and improve the teaching of legal ethics in
American law schools.32 These grants supported considerable study of thencurrent approaches to teaching legal ethics33 as well as experimentation with
new methods. They led to the publication in 1996 of three symposium issues
of American law reviews dedicated to canvassing and debating the results of
the Keck-supported studies and curricular changes.34
The Keck-supported work continued the discussions that were already
ongoing about whether the law school curriculum should situate instruction
on legal ethics and professionalism in a single freestanding course taught in a
conventional classroom, in an experiential course or courses in a law school’s
clinical program, or in modules and themes pervasively embedded across
the curriculum in courses focused on other areas of substantive law. Faculty
members who had piloted courses and programs designed along all three of
these broad lines published articles singing and at least loosely documenting
the praises of what the Keck funds had enabled them to build or sustain.35 The
29.

See Ian Johnstone & Mary Patricia Treuthart, Doing the Right Thing: An Overview of Teaching
Professional Responsibility, 41 J. Legal Educ. 75, 87 (1991).

30.

See id. at 90.

31.

See James Moliterno, An Analysis of Ethics Teaching in Law Schools: Replacing Lost Benefits of the
Apprentice System in the Academic Atmosphere, 60 U. Cin. L. Rev. 83, 91 (1991)

32.

Thomas B. Metzloff & David B. Wilkins, Foreword, 58 Law
(1995).

33.

Writing in 1991, James Moliterno summarized the rival methods of instruction that were then
common as “lecture, problem-based discussion, case-opinion based discussion, example
(including lawyer case studies and faculty or supervisor role modeling), and role-sensitive
representation activity (including both client and simulated client representation).”, supra
note 32, at 105.

34.

One appeared in volume 58 of Law and Contemporary Problems, the other two in volumes
38 and 39 of the Wm. & Mary L. Rev.

35.

See, e.g., Thomas D. Morgan, Use of the Problem Method for Teaching Legal Ethics, 39 Wm. & Mary L.
Rev. 409 (1998) (the problem method); Thomas L. Shaffer, On Teaching Legal Ethics with Stories

and

Contemp. Problems 1, 1
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Keck-supported literature also saw interesting discussion about expanding
the range of materials for teaching legal ethics and professionalism beyond
the usual law school fare of rules and judicial opinions. Instructors using film
clips, fiction, and oral histories of prominent lawyers claimed effectiveness in
stimulating reflection on what it means to be an ethical professional in the law.
One emerging theme in this literature was that the prevailing pedagogy
of ethics and professionalism was attending too much to the rules of ethics
and not enough to the developing moral perception and other non-cognitive
contributors to an ethical practice of law. Like the rest of the law school
curriculum, this critique went, the standard approach to ethics instruction
privileged rules and reason to the detriment or exclusion of feelings, “personal
relationships, personal values, and personal morality.”36 In its fixation on the
formal rules constraining lawyer behavior, it avoided deeper and more personal
questions about developing moral responsibility and moral perception37 and
about “engag[ing] clients in moral conversations about the lawyers’ and the
clients’ moral responsibilities and the moral dimensions of a case.”38
The periodical literature did not return in a comprehensive way to the
teaching of ethics and professionalism until the appearance of a symposium
issue on “the formation of an ethical professional identity in the peer-review
professions” in the University of St. Thomas Law Review in 2008. What had been
the somewhat marginal theme of personal morality in the Keck-supported
symposia of the mid-90s now moved front and center: virtually all of the
work stipulated that “[w]ith respect to the elements of an ethical professional
identity, ... a foundation ... is created by self-knowledge and growth of the
moral self from narcissism toward responsibility to other people.”39 The focus
of this symposium’s intervention in the literature was on the notion that
professional ethics education could support “the holistic formation” of “an
ethical professional identity” connecting technical professional skills with a
profession’s highest purposes.40
about Clients, 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 421 (1998) (clinic-based narrative method).
36.

John Mixon and Robert P. Schuwerk, The Personal Dimension of Professional Responsibility,” 58 Law
& Contemp. Probs. 87, 91 (1996).

37.

See Lisa Lerman, Teaching Moral Perception and Moral Judgment in Legal Ethics Courses: A Dialogue
about Goals, 39 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 457, 460-69 (1998).

38.

Christine Mary Vener, Encouraging Personal Responsibility—An Alternative Approach to Teaching Legal
Ethics, 58 Law & Contemp. Probs. 287, 290 (1996).

39.

Neil Hamilton, Foreword, The Formation of an Ethical Professional Identity in the Peer-Review Professions,
5 U. St. Thomas L.J. 361, 363 (2008).

40.

Id. at 361. A follow-up symposium published in the University of St. Thomas Law Journal in
2011 continued the theme of considering ethics instruction in law schools as contributing to a
process of moral and professional “formation” rather than simply instilling an understanding
of ethical rules. See Robert K. Vischer, Foreword to Symposium on “The Lawyer’s Role and Professional
Formation,” 9 U. St. Thomas L.J. 215 (2011) (summarizing symposium papers).
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For legal education, the most important contribution to this symposium
came from Ann Colby and William M. Sullivan,41 both of whom had just
wrapped up the multi-year “Preparation for the Professions” program of
the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching.42 That program
carefully examined “the goals and practices of professional education in ...
five fields,” including law, through site visits and data analysis in order to
“understand their strengths and weaknesses, and to recommend strategies
for improving professional preparation.”43 The Carnegie project helpfully
identified three common “apprenticeships” in all professional education:
an apprenticeship of knowledge, an apprenticeship of practice, and an
apprenticeship of professional roles and responsibilities.44 In legal education,
students acquire knowledge of the substance of the law and skill at analytical
thinking in the first apprenticeship. In the second apprenticeship, law students
learn the skills of law practice through clinical work, simulation exercises,
writing courses, and the like. The third apprenticeship is where law students
are acculturated to the “essential social purposes” of the practice of law and to
the “ethical standards and practices, professional sensibilities, and ... sense of
professional identity” that define the field.45
Colby and Sullivan were careful to note that in all of the professions, the
third apprenticeship is not distinct from the first two; in some ways it arises
from and integrates what students learn in those.46 The third is, however,
the apprenticeship that gets the least amount of attention and cultivation in
legal education, to the point of being “marginalized.”47 The Carnegie study
uncovered a reason for this. The third apprenticeship is not about knowing
the law or how to “think like a lawyer” or how to cross-examine a witness or
how to negotiate a settlement. It is about developing the basis of a career-long
purpose to live up to the ethical norms and highest public purposes of the
profession itself. But the Carnegie team’s law school site visits revealed strong
doubts among both faculty and students that “professional educators are ...
responsible for shaping students’ ethical development, that this enterprise
is ... legitimate, and that it is [any] longer feasible to influence the ethical
development of students once they are young adults.”48 That, Colby and
41.

Ann Colby and William M. Sullivan, Formation of Professionalism and Purpose: Perspectives from the
Preparation for the Professions Program, 5 U. St. Thomas L.J. 404 (2008).

42.

This program produced a much-discussed report, known colloquially as “the Carnegie
Report.” See William M. Sullivan, et al, Educating Lawyers: Preparation for the
Profession of Law (2007).

43.

Id. at 409.

44.

See id.

45.

See id. at 410.

46.

See id. at 411.

47.

See id. at 419.

48.

Id. at 420. Russell G. Pearce summarizes and criticizes the view that law school comes too
late for moral instruction in Teaching Ethics Seriously: Legal Ethics as the Most Important Subject in Law
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Sullivan plausibly argue, is a big part of why the apprenticeship of ethics and
professional identity plays a marginal role in legal education.
The Carnegie study of the professions suggested another reason. Law
schools emphasize the first apprenticeship (knowledge of the law and
development of analytical thinking skills); their main pedagogical mode is
that of what Colby and Sullivan call “the academy.”49 By this they mean that
most of the instruction takes place in a conventional classroom setting that
privileges “skepticism, intellectual rigor, and objectivity.”50 In such a setting,
they point out, “it is not surprising that the third apprenticeship tends to be
suspect, since it requires engagement rather than distance, and commitment
rather than thoroughgoing skepticism.”51 Colby and Sullivan note that fields
such as medicine and nursing, which give priority to the second apprenticeship
(where the focus is the acquisition of professional skills), tend to take the third
apprenticeship more seriously.52 Attention to professional identity and purpose
is to be expected in a setting like a patient encounter, where the professional
stakes are visceral and high.
The work of the Carnegie team significantly enriched our thinking about the
pedagogy of legal ethics and professionalism by positioning the development
of character at the center of a discussion that had formerly focused on conduct
and the rules constraining it.53 In one way, however, the Carnegie approach
slighted an important piece of the third apprenticeship. At every point where
Colby and Sullivan speak of the third apprenticeship, they invoke a morality
that is internal to the profession. They say, for example, that the apprenticeship
“is meant to capture students’ induction into the field’s ethical standards and
practices, professional sensibilities, appreciation for and commitment to the
field’s essential social purposes, and sense of professional identity in which
those purposes and standards are experienced as core features of what it means
to practice that profession.”54 They argue that the third apprenticeship must
help students develop “[h]abits of interpretation or salience through which
complex situations are understood and framed at least in part in moral terms,
that is, in terms of the field’s purposes and standards.”55
What this focus on role morality misses, of course, is the tension between
role morality and ordinary morality. A lawyer exclusively focused on acting
School, 29 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 719, 732-35 (1998).
49.

Colby & Sullivan, supra note 41, at 420.

50.

Id.

51.

Id.

52.

See id. at 421.

53.

It must be noted that the Carnegie Report was not without its critics. See W. Bradley
Wendel, Should Law Schools Teach Professional Duties, Professional Virtues, or Something Else? A Critique of
the Carnegie Report on Educating Lawyers, 9 U. St. Thomas L. Rev. 497 (2011).

54.

Colby & Sullivan, supra note 41, at 410 (emphasis added).

55.

Id. at 415 (emphasis added).
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in role might blind himself to contexts in which role morality deviates from
other moral structures, including his own personal code. It is not enough
for a professional to commit herself to “the field’s purposes and standards;”
she must also learn to look for contexts in which commitment to “the field’s
purposes and standards” might lead her astray. After all, those “purposes
and standards” tend to reward zeal in an advocate and to celebrate lawyerly
cleverness. These features are not deviations from what Colby and Sullivan
call “the profession’s social ends and civic foundations”56 or its “public
purpose;”57 they are among its basic methods. They are building blocks of its
institutions. It is therefore practically inevitable that a single-minded focus on
the field’s purposes and standards will risk endorsement of too much zeal58 and
too much cleverness,59 or at least fail to train students to be on the lookout for
an excess of those things, in themselves and in others. What is needed in the
third apprenticeship is not just a focus on the role behaviors that are prized by
legal institutions but also a challenge to what Parker Palmer calls “the myth
that institutions are external to us and constrain us.”60 It must remind students
of “all of the ways in which [lawyers] co-create institutional pathologies”61 that
can lead the profession to condone or approve what is morally troubling or
even unconscionable.62
The risk of relying too exclusively on the legal profession’s own account of
itself in ethics education is revealed in a vignette from my home institution, the
University of North Carolina School of Law. Some twenty years ago, the school
offered a course designed to teach law students ethics and professionalism
through the methods of oral history.63 Students were trained in interviewing
techniques and then sent out to interview local “lawyers and judges who [were]
living lives dedicated to a higher purpose, who love[d] what they [were] doing,
56.

Id. at 406.

57.

Id. at 426.
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Colby and Sullivan acknowledge this risk, though they too unreflectively characterize
excessive zeal—“the attorney as hired gun”—as a “deviation[ ] from ethical practice” rather
than as a byproduct of it. See id. at 418-19.
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Cf. William Damon, et al., Passion & Mastery in Balance: Toward Good Work in the Professions, 134
Daedalus, no. 3, 27, 31 (2005) (noting “the sheer delight of intellectual virtuosity as an
end in itself” that can develop among law students in the latter part of their professional
education).
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Parker J. Palmer, A New Professional: The Aims of Education Revisited, 29 Change 6, 9 (Nov-Dec
2007).
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Id.
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See generally David Luban, Stevens’s Professionalism and Ours, 38 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 297, 315
(1996).
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See Walter H. Bennett, Jr., The University of North Carolina Intergenerational Legal Ethics Project:
Expanding the Contexts for Teaching Professional Ethics and Values, 58 Law and Contemp. Probs. 173
(1995).
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and who [found] intellectual richness and creativity in lawyers’ work.”64 In the
words of the course’s creator, these were lawyers who were “proud of being
members of the profession, who [felt] that being a lawyer involves a deep
moral commitment, that it is a position not only of prestige but of honor.”65
This creative approach to teaching ethics and professionalism had the virtue
of engaging students in a far more personal kind of study than what goes on in
the typical classroom. It sought to “reconnect[ ] issues of professional values
to questions of personal and societal morality ... by encouraging students to
view lawyers not only as professionals, but as individuals and members of their
communities.”66
The journal article introducing this innovative course to the larger
community of legal educators opened with a quotation from one of the course’s
oral history subjects, the late Judge Frank W. Snepp of the Mecklenburg
County Superior Court. This epigraph seemed to sum up the rationale for
the course itself while also portraying Judge Snepp as just the sort of seasoned
ethical expert to inspire law students to reach for a higher level:
I think the ethical tone of the Bar has dropped way below what’s acceptable....
If a lawyer doesn’t know an ethical problem when it confronts him, that’s the
problem. They don’t know whether they’ve got an ethical problem. They just
barge ahead. And if you haven’t got that gut feeling, “wait a minute here,
there’s something here,” and look into it, they can give you all the courses in
the world. It’s not going to give you that.67

The idea that students might begin to develop that “gut sense” through
sustained personal contact with a luminary like Judge Snepp was novel and
worthwhile.
On careful examination, though, Judge Snepp was a troubling role model.
In the early 1970s, Snepp had presided over a notorious criminal trial that
emblematized the lid of repression that southern whites tried to force over black
political activism of the late 1960s and early 1970s. The case of “the Charlotte
Three” was a prosecution of young black political activists for allegedly burning
down a horse stable from which one of them had been barred on account of
his race. Though the evidence was thin and the trial marred by prosecutorial
misconduct, the nearly all-white jury that Judge Snepp empaneled convicted
all three of them and the judge sentenced them to terms of as long as 25 years’
imprisonment, by far the harshest sentences for arson in anyone’s memory and
longer even than those for fires that claimed human life.68
64.

Walter Bennett, The Lawyer’s Myth: Reviving Ideals in the Legal Profession 6 (2001).

65.

Id.
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Bennett, supra note 63, at 191.
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Id. at 173 (quoting Frank W. Snepp).
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See Heather Ann Thompson, All Across the Nation: Urban Black Activism, North and South, 1965-1957,
in African American Urban History since World War II 194-201 (Kenneth L. Kusmer
& Joe W. Trotter eds., 2009). In the New York Times, Tom Wicker editorialized critically
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The case of the Charlotte Three and the brutality of its outcome did not give
a misleading impression of Judge Snepp’s views on race or judicial demeanor.
His UNC oral history—the oral history from which the epigraph was drawn—is
full of bigoted and dismissive quips about minority groups.69 In addition, it
was also no secret that Judge Snepp comported himself bluntly, even brutally,
from the bench. An Associated Press profile described him as what we might
today call a bully, a judge “known for his quick wit, short fuse and sharp tongue”
who “[f]or 22 years ... ha[d] scowled—sometimes red-faced—from behind the
bench.”70 Lawyers who had appeared before him called him “a high-pressure
hose that gets loose” and a judge who “reduces lawyers to jelly.”71 Even those
lawyers who praised him described the judge as “too impatient, hot-tempered,
abrasive and quick to make up his mind.”72
The purpose of this brief profile of Judge Snepp is not to demonize him.
Although his courtroom manner was intemperate, his social views were surely
shared by other white southern men of his socioeconomic class and generation.
The point is rather to highlight that a law school program seeking to connect
students in the 1990s with prominent exemplars of professionalism identified
Judge Snepp as an appropriate candidate and his “gut feeling” as a fitting
epigraph for the program itself.73
about the case to a national readership, calling Judge Snepp’s sentences “unusually harsh
even by the standards of the law-and-order atmosphere of the Nixon years.” Tom Wicker,
Law and Vengeance, N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 1974, at 31.
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Carolina at Chapel Hill (Feb. 25, 1993) (on file in the Southern Oral History Program
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The legal profession, like all professions, wants to lionize its luminaries and
elders as wise and heroic. It wants to hold up an icon like John W. Davis as
a “paragon of virtue and rectitude and [a] conscience of the community”74
without accounting for the fact that Davis chose to devote his full energies to
the defense of American racial apartheid, not just early in his career but at its
end, when the moral horrors of that system were becoming apparent to lawyers
all over the country.75 The profession wants to venerate a powerful lawyer like
John J. McCloy as a “lawyer-statesman”76 without grappling with McCloy’s
role as an architect of the wartime legal system that uprooted and imprisoned
tens of thousands of American citizens without charges of wrongdoing, on
the basis of nothing more than their parents’ country of origin.77 To be sure,
judges like Frank Snepp and lawyers like John Davis and John McCloy might
serve as useful examples in the professional development of attorneys, but the
example could be of something nuanced rather than noble—the power that
lawyers have to do great harm in the name of, rather than in violation of, their
professional ethos.
In summary, over several decades, the literature has suggested a number
of strategies for supplementing and improving instruction in legal ethics and
professionalism in American law schools—strategies that not every instructor
embraces but that nonetheless enjoy broad acceptance. Students should have
the chance to learn through experience rather than just through reading and
Socratic dialogue. Students should engage with a wider range of learning
materials than rules and cases, and these should include narratives—both
fictional and real—about lawyers’ lives. Students should be encouraged,
even expected, to raise their sights above the rules of professional conduct
and examine deeper and more ambiguous issues of emotional and moral
development. Students should learn to appreciate the lawyer’s role morality
within a broader moral framework that will allow her to see when acting in
role carries danger. Students should be offered an apprenticeship to carry
them past the acquisition of substantive knowledge and practical skill toward
a career-long appreciation of the tremendous responsibility lawyers have for
the welfare of others.
The FASPE program presents one way of addressing some of these
needs. By harnessing the power of place, the FASPE fellowship provides an
immersive learning experience that compels each fellow to confront emotional
74.

Bennett, supra note 64, at 39.
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evidence of the degradation and violence in a system of law created and
managed by legal professionals. This happens not only at a wild and barbaric
site like Auschwitz, where the most extreme violence was practiced, but also at
a refined and elegant site like the House of the Wannsee Conference, where,
as noted at the outset, the perpetrators were mostly lawyers. These settings
disrupt the fellows’ understanding of legal ethics and professionalism, shifting
it to a more emotional plane.
FASPE also supplies the fellows with a wider variety of learning materials
than is common in a law school course on ethics and professionalism. Of
course, the physical sites themselves become learning materials; this is another
way of describing the impact of the power of place. But the curriculum also
includes various narrative depictions of lawyers and others making decisions
with grave ethical ramifications—films showing lawyers deciding upon the
deaths of millions and experimental subjects deciding whether to administer
electrical shocks to an innocent person. It includes a case study of Bernhard
Lösener, the perplexing Nazi lawyer mentioned earlier,78 who can plausibly be
seen as both a builder of and a brake on the engine of the persecution of Jews
through the 1930s and who abandoned his post when no longer able to claim
ignorance of the reality of genocide. It includes a face-to-face meeting with a
survivor of Auschwitz and Birkenau who narrates the tragedies that befell her
and her family.
This last narrative reveals another unique aspect of FASPE’s approach to
ethics and professionalism: it gives a prominent place not just to lawyers but
also to the people harmed by lawyers. This is the central reason for the visit
to Auschwitz and Birkenau on the FASPE trip. The FASPE fellows spend
time in Germany, walking in the footsteps of the Nazi lawyers and trying to
imagine their mindsets and motivations, but then travel to the killing fields
in Poland to confront the human impact of what those lawyers did. It is
an opportunity for the fellows to imagine themselves into the lives of those
touched (and destroyed) by lawyers’ power. Including the experiences of
victims distinguishes FASPE’s approach to legal ethics from those common in
law school curricula, which focus chiefly on lawyers and the rules constraining
them.
Another distinction should be obvious but nonetheless bears mention.
FASPE teaches chiefly by negative example. It abandons the heroic narrative
of an Atticus Finch or a Thurgood Marshall (not to mention the falsely heroic
narrative of a Frank Snepp) in favor of the tortured and torturing narrative
of a Bernhard Lösener. The point of looking so unflinchingly into the face of
evil is not to scare the fellows straight. FASPE does not cast all Nazi lawyers
as unrecognizable moral monsters. Rather, it invites the fellows to find in a
character like Bernhard Lösener traces of themselves: ambition, cleverness,
competitiveness, patriotism, acceptance of the status quo. It rejects the trite
and mistaken depiction of the Nazi legal system as a mere veneer of legality
shielding a wholly corrupt and lawless interior, emphasizing instead the
78.

See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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numerous points of connection between the Nazi legal system and the legal
system of the Weimar Republic that preceded it—as well as the legal systems
of other nations, including our own.79 The FASPE fellow looks into the face
of evil to see, in certain moments, her own resemblance. This is uncomfortable
work, rather distinct from the cheerful hope that law students will be inspired
to live and practice ethically through exposure to the stories of heroes, lawyerstatesmen, and pillars of the community.80
A final distinction between FASPE and the common legal ethics course in a
law school classroom is that FASPE is completely immersive. From the moment
the FASPE fellows arrive in New York, they are together (with each other, and,
to a great extent, with faculty and staff) for twelve straight days. These are
days not just of seminar study but of travel, meals, jet lag, entertainment, corooming, and sightseeing. Friendships form; at moments they also fray. People
move from resilience to vulnerability and back again on their own timetables.
There are tears, and there is laughter. FASPE is, in other words, something of
a cocoon that forms around the fellows to permit them the intense reflection
and personal engagement that stimulates personal and moral growth. It is safe
to say that the program of legal education at no American law school could
afford to create such an opportunity for its students, as a matter of either time
or funding.
This is not to say, however, that FASPE’s approach to ethics and professional
formation has no place in American legal education. Americans need not travel
overseas to confront sites of great human suffering designed and defended
by lawyers. American law and American lawyers created and nourished the
plantation economy and protected the slave trade.81 Those sites of suffering
remain. American law and American lawyers created and defended the legal
structures that exiled and imprisoned American Indians and attacked and
undermined their cultures.82 Those sites of suffering remain. American law
and American lawyers designed and defended the uprooting and incarceration
of tens of thousands of Japanese Americans in camps during World War II.83
Those sites of suffering remain. For every heroic lawyer defending a lunch
79.

Though it is uncomfortable for Americans to acknowledge this, laws enforcing racial
supremacy and separation and laws authorizing eugenic sterilization were common in the
United States in the mid-1930s, much as they were in Germany. See David Fraser, Law
After Auschwitz 95-97, 107-17 (2005).

80.

I do not mean to suggest that FASPE is alone in the idea that students can profit from
studying lawyers who do wrong. Richard Abel’s excellent Lawyers in the Dock: Learning
from Attorney Disciplinary Proceedings (2008) takes a similar approach, though the
lawyer conduct catalogued in Abel’s book does not approach the evil of the Nazi system.

81.

See Robert Cover, Justice Accused (1975); Slavery and the Law (Paul Finkelman ed.,
1997); Eric L. Muller, Judging Thomas Ruffin and the Hindsight Defense, 87 N.C. L. Rev. 757 (2009).

82.

See Tim Alan Garrison, The Legal Ideology of Removal, The Southern Judiciary and
the Sovereignty of Native American Nations (2009).

83.

See Peter Irons, Justice at War (1983); Eric L. Muller, Hirabayashi and the Invasion Evasion, 88
N.C. L. Rev. 1333 (2010).

402

Journal of Legal Education

counter protester of Jim Crow, there was a network of laws and lawyers
prosecuting and persecuting him.84 Those sites of suffering remain.
At many American law schools, it is possible to visit such a site for the cost
of a bus or a train ticket, and at others for the cost of a domestic plane ticket.
Some such sites—plantation slave quarters, or a Woolworth lunch counter85 that
company lawyers fought to keep segregated—would speak with unmistakable
clarity. Others—the grassland where once stood an internment camp or the
halls of an historic courtroom—would require the assistance of an historical
interpreter to make them speak, but such interpreters abound, sometimes as
nearby as the halls of a campus history department. While FASPE supports
twelve days of isolation and immersion, a powerful group dynamic could surely
take hold in a shorter time, perhaps even a Spring Break trip or even a fourday weekend. FASPE is admittedly costly, but if the American bar is serious
in its concern for the decline of professionalism, law firms might be persuaded
to help fund a powerful program fostering moral and ethical reflection and
formation.
The approach of FASPE should not and will not replace the more
conventional methods of instruction in ethics and professionalism in American
law school classrooms. It does, however, show how some of the holes in the
standard curriculum might be filled, thereby helping the discipline renew
its commitment not just to educating law students about conduct rules but
launching them on a lifelong path of moral professional formation.
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